We model an R&D race in which each firm decides in each period between two research projects, only one of which has positive success probability and it is not known which. There is symmetric information and hence scope for strategic search. If the prize is shared when discovery is simultaneous there is too much duplication of projects. If neither is rewarded in this event then equilibrium is efficient unless projects have asymmetric costs, in which case there is a bias toward the high-cost project, or asymmetric success probabilities, in which case too little duplication is possible. If one firm is informed, it may choose the wrong project to put the other off the scent.
Introduction
The economics literature on R&D has been mainly concerned with the overall level of firms' investment in R&D, which influences the speed of research, rather than with the allocation of this investment between competing research projects. It frequently happens, however, that firms which are competing in R&D have a choice about which research avenue to pursue. For example, there may be more than one type of potential product which could in principle, if certain technological breakthroughs are achieved, satisfy a given consumer demand, broadly defined; alternatively, there may be several possible research paths any of which might or might not lead to a particular invention or scientific discovery. In such situations it can happen that one firm spends very large sums of money on what turns out ex post to be the wrong technology while its competitor makes the right choice and consequently ends up dominating the market. Equally, it could happen that both firms choose the right path but make simultaneous discoveries and, as a result, end up competing away the surplus. For an example of the former, consider the race in the 1970s to develop a marketable video player. Two main paths were followed. One was RCA's preferred approach, SelectaVision, which involved a disc whose capacitance variations were read by a stylus and the other, developed by Sony and JVC, involved magnetic tape. The disc system turned out to be the wrong choice and RCA were forced to write off $580 million (Graham (1986) , Scherer (1992)) 1 . For an example of simultaneous discovery 2 , take the parallel inventions in 1972 by Casio and Texas Instruments of the first electronic mini-calculator, built around a single MOS/LSI chip. The two companies competed away the surplus and failed to recoup their R&D investment (Scherer (1992), pp.65-67) 3 . The pharmaceutical industry also provides many examples of these 1 Other examples come from the aircraft and facsimile machine industries. In the 1950s, while Boeing developed the 707 four-engine turbojet, Lockheed invested in an alternative turboprop technology, which turned out to be a failure (Scherer (1992) , p.68). In the 1970s, while U.S. companies concentrated on developing facsimile machines which were integrated into office automated systems, Japanese companies developed free-standing machines. The latter won the contest and came to dominate the market (Business Week (1981) ).
2 Simultaneous discovery is a familiar phenomenon in science. Robert K. Merton (1961) has written of "multiples" (cases where several researchers have made the same scientific discovery), and reports data on how frequently eminent scientists have been involved in such multiple discoveries. The British physicist, Lord Kelvin, was a participant in 32 separate simultaneous discoveries. We have also seen the phenomenon in economic theory, for example in optimal auction design.
3 Similarly, in the 1960s Lockheed and Douglas both spent very large sums of money on the development of a wide-bodied three-engined jet airliner. They brought very similar models, the Lockheed L-1011 and the Douglas DC-10, to the market within months of each other and as a result they both made large losses (The Economist (1985) ).
phenomena. One such is the development by Merck-Frosst of an asthma medicine based on blocking the action of leukotrienes (see the Merck-Frosst website). The researchers considered two broad approaches, an "inhibition" and an "antagonist" strategy, and, after experimenting with both, chose the latter path, ultimately successfully. The process for synthesising leukotrienes was simultaneously discovered by two groups.
Firms in this position face a trade-off. On the one hand, choosing to pursue a different path from your rival may reduce the probability that you make near-simultaneous discoveries and bring your products to market at the same time. On the other hand, it increases the probability that you choose the wrong path while your rival chooses the right one. The question naturally arises: is it the case, as might be suggested by the frequency of simultaneous discovery, that firms and research groups are driven by competition and by reward systems to "herd" on the same type of project instead of diversifying their research in a socially optimal way?
As the discussion of the literature below makes clear, this question has been raised before, but largely in a static context. We propose a simple dynamic model in which to study this issue and we derive a number of effects which are not apparent in the existing literature. In this model there are two firms searching for a given invention or process improvement and two possible avenues of research (or projects), only one of which could bear fruit (and this one will do so if it is researched for long enough). The firms do not know which of the two possible methods of proceeding is the right one. Researching a project involves a per-period cost. Each firm can research only one project in each period but can switch at any time in the light of its own experience and that of the other firm. Each firm observes the other's choice of project and this raises the question whether the degree of duplication is affected by dynamic strategic considerations. The project choice of one firm affects the evolution of the other firm's beliefs and therefore its future choices. This opens up the possibility that a firm might deviate from the social optimum in its project choice in order to influence the other firm's future behaviour. Alternatively, might it be socially optimal to have a firm "experiment" by choosing a project with a lower probability of success in order to obtain information which will subsequently be useful? If so, will the firms, acting non-cooperatively, have the incentive to do the same?
We first look at two versions of the static model, as benchmarks. In this case too we find effects which are not discussed in the literature. In one version, the cost of search and probability of discovery for a given project are both fixed while in the other expending costly effort can increase the probability of success. If the costs are fixed and if the reward structure is such that there is no payoff for either firm in the event of simultaneous discovery ("Bertrand payoffs") then the non-cooperative equilibrium is efficient. However, we identify two effects which can cause excessive correlation (i.e., duplication). Firstly, in the variable cost variant of the model there is an effort externality: although the efforts of the two firms are efficient (conditional on the choices of project), the effort expended by a firm goes down if the other firm chooses the same project and the latter, in choosing a project, does not take this into account. Secondly, in either variant, there is a "prizesharing" effect: a payoff structure according to which both firms are paid a positive amount for simultaneous discovery gives rise to too much duplication.
In the dynamic version of the model, we restrict attention to the case in which the per-period research cost of a given project is fixed. A project i is characterized by three parameters: the probability p i that i is the right choice (which changes over time in the light of the search experience of both firms), the per-period cost c i , and the per-period probability of success π i conditional on i being the right choice.
If the projects are symmetric with respect to cost and conditional probability then, given Bertrand payoffs, the infinite horizon solutions are the same as the single-period solutions. That is, the social planner behaves myopically, allocating firms to projects in such a way as to maximize the current probability of discovery, and, in stationary noncooperative equilibrium, the firms do the same. As in the static case, sharing the prize leads to too much correlation.
In the case in which projects are asymmetric and payoffs are Bertrand we identify three further sources of inefficiency, some of which involve too much correlation and others too little. (i) If the costs of the two sites are unequal then there is a "pre-emption effect" which implies that the firms choose the higher-cost project too frequently (this corresponds either to too much or too little correlation, depending on beliefs). Whereas the social planner has an incentive to give up some current probability of success in order to research the lower-cost project first, each firm has less incentive to do this because it wants to pre-empt the other's discovery. (ii) If the conditional probabilities are unequal then, in a two-period model, there is a "strategic differentiation effect" giving rise to too much diversification. In this case, for some beliefs, the first mover inefficiently chooses the less promising project in order to avoid competing directly with the other firm, who will choose the better project in the first period regardless of the first mover's choice. The benefit of this choice for the first mover is that in the second period it will be able, as a result of updating of beliefs, to research the better project alone in the second period. This is an example of a firm giving up some current expected payoff in order to influence the beliefs of the other player, for its own future advantage. (iii) We also look at a two-period incomplete information version of the model in which one firm (the first mover) may be informed about which is the right project. For some parameters there is an equilibrium which exhibits a "disinformation effect": for a range of beliefs, the informed firm chooses the wrong project in the first period in order to send the other firm down the wrong path.
It is then able to research the right project alone in the second period. This is therefore an example of insufficient duplication.
Related literature
In the theoretical literature in economics on R&D, the incentive to over-invest in aggregate in non-cooperative equilibrium has been well-documented. (See, for example, Reinganum(1979 Reinganum( , 1982 , Loury (1979) , Lee and Wilde (1980) , Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) .) A few papers, notably Bhattacharya and Mookherjee (1986), Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) , Klette and de Meza (1986) and, in a different vein, Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) have also raised the issue of the allocation of research effort across competing projects. Bhattacharya-Mookherjee and Dasgupta-Maskin both investigate whether re-searchers' projects are too close to each other in equilibrium. These papers differ from ours in a number of ways; in particular, they only study a static model. In Bhattacharya and Mookherjee's model each firm has access to two research projects, each of which is a single draw from a random variable; a firm has a continuous set of strategies and its choice from this set determines how the realized values of these projects determine the firm's research output (which can be thought of as the inverse of the time to discovery).
The winner is the firm with the highest output (and the winner takes all). In most of their specifications they find that the social optimum and the non-cooperative solutions coincide and that both involve the maximum amount of specialization -this is socially optimal because minimizing correlation between the firms' outputs increases the probability that when one firm's output is low the other's is high, and the social planner is only interested in the maximum of the two outputs. They do find, however, that if both society and firms are risk-averse and each firm has access to a private project and a public project then, under certain distributional assumptions, there may be too much specialization in equilibrium (too little investment in the publicly available research avenue) 4 .
Dasgupta and Maskin's conclusion, by contrast, is that there is too much correlation in research projects. As in the Bhattacharya and Mookherjee paper, a pair of outputs (x 1 , x 2 ) is produced and the social value of the research (as well as the winner's prize)
is given by the larger x i . Players choose research locations along a continuum and the closer they are, the higher the likelihood that x 1 and x 2 are close. Like Bhattacharya and Mookherjee, they conclude that placing the firms as far away from each other as possible is socially optimal and also privately optimal if all locations have the same cost, because this reduces the degree of correlation and increases the probability that if one firm fails, the other will succeed. They show that there is too much correlation in equilibrium if the cost of a project rises with its distance from the centre of the interval -a firm does not internalize the beneficial effect it has on the other firm if it moves further away from it. Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) giving a positive probability of wasteful duplication of research effort and also a positive probability that neither starts with the most promising box. The reason for this is that if player 1 followed any deterministic strategy player 2 could simply choose in each period the box which player 1 intends to open in the following period. Our model differs from this in that looking in the right box (researching the right project) is no guarantee of finding the prize, and the players observe each other's search choice each period. This allows for the possibility that a firm might attempt to influence the other's search through its own choices; it also means that duplication might be efficient but that the firms do not duplicate their research enough, as indeed we find in some cases.
Another dynamic allocation model is Bolton and Harris (1999) . Their model has N players each of whom chooses in each period between two actions, one with a known average reward per unit of time and the other with an unknown average reward. Two major differences between their framework and ours are, firstly, that our model involves a race rather than a game with a flow of positive payoffs to each player and, secondly, that in Bolton and Harris's model there is no rivalry: only the information-gathering interaction is important.
The Model
Two identical firms, A and B, are engaged in search for a prize of value v > 0. There are two possible research avenues available, one and only one of which can succeed. By analogy with a well-known single-person sequential decision theory problem (the buried treasure problem) we refer to these avenues (or projects) as sites 5 . There are two sites, S 1 and S 2 , and the prize (or treasure) is present at one and only one of them. Time is discrete. Our main model has an infinite horizon but we also consider variants of the model in a two-period setting. In each period each firm can search at one, and only one, of the sites. If a firm searches at site S i (i = 1, 2) the probability that it finds the treasure in the current period, conditional on the treasure actually being at site S i , is π i ∈ (0, 1) (this probability applies regardless of whether the other firm is searching the same site).
For the most part we assume that π 1 = π 2 = π but we will relax this assumption below in a two-period setting. In each period the cost of searching at site S i is c i > 0, where
We assume throughout that v is sufficiently large relative to the costs that it is always in the interest of both firms to continue searching (recall that each believes that there is probability one that the prize is present at one or other site). Rather than making an explicit calculation of the lower bound for v which we require for our results (which would be tedious) we repeatedly use the formula "for large enough v" in our proofs. Our assumption is that v is larger than the maximum of the implied critical values.
The game proceeds as follows. In each period firm A moves first (i.e. chooses a site to search) while firm B observes which site A has chosen and decides whether to search at the same site or at the other one. Each firm pays the cost of searching its chosen site and they then search simultaneously. If either firm discovers the prize then the game is over.
If neither discovers then each observes this fact and the same sequence of events takes place in the next period, and so on. Both firms are risk-neutral. If there is a discovery by A at site S i and B does not make a discovery then the payoffs for that period are v − c i to A and −c j to B, where S j is the site searched by B. We consider two alternative payoff structures to apply in the event that both firms simultaneously discover the prize (which of course can only happen if they search the same site).
(a) Bertrand payoffs: both firms get a current payoff of −c i if they both successfully search site S i .
5 See, for example, Ross (1983) or Gittins (1989) .
(b) Prize-sharing payoffs: both firms get a current payoff of (v/2) − c i if they both successfully search site S i .
Discussion of the Model
(i) We assume that there is a single prize which is present at one and only one site, so that the values of the two projects are not stochastically independent. This is the same structure as in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) , but is relatively non-standard.
Preliminary investigation suggests that most of our results would be qualitatively similar if we assumed instead that the sites were independent, so that there might turn out to be two prizes or none. There are, in any case, situations in which there is only one line of research which could have arrived at the discovery. For instance, in the search for the structure of DNA only the double helix "site" contained the treasure while the single helix approach, pursued by Linus Pauling, did not. There are also many cases of commercial R&D projects which, it is clear in retrospect, would have been unlikely ever to have reached the required technical standard 6 .
(ii) Our model has discrete time (which entails that simultaneous discovery is possible, which it is not in continuous time models of R&D competition) and, for the most part, we assume that there is a fixed per-period cost of research. We concentrate on the fixed cost case partly because our focus is on the choice of project rather than on the intensity of research, but also because this model seems a good approximation to many situations of interest. There is empirical evidence that firms commit themselves to a particular scale of R&D spending for considerable periods of time (Pakes (1985) ). Furthermore, as the case of the Lockheed Tristar and Douglas DC-10 illustrates, simultaneous discovery is a real phenomenon (see footnote 1). Our assumption that a firm searches only one site in each period also seems to fit many types of high-technology R&D competition.
For example, in the videoplayer race, after preliminary experimentation with a variety of possible technologies, including magnetic tapes, holographic tapes and various disc technologies, RCA concentrated more or less entirely on the capacitance-based disc system (Graham (1986) ).
(iii) Our two versions of the payoff structure are intended to correspond to two different market environments. In some kinds of R&D competition patent protection is important in maintaining a monopoly position but in many instances, particularly in high technology research, patent protection is weak because competitors are able to invent around the patent (Scherer (1992) , p.110). In the latter cases, however, first-mover advantages can often enable the first discoverer to establish a dominant position. We think of the Bertrand case as corresponding to this latter situation. Suppose that underlying our discrete time model is a continuous time model in which the firms are able to make their decisions about which project to invest in only at discrete intervals (corresponding to our discrete periods). If both firms discover within the same period then neither wins a patent, both bring their product to the market and since neither has a significant firstmover advantage they compete away the surplus. The cases in footnote 1 are examples of this. If only one firm discovers in a particular period then the other firm drops out at the next decision point because even if it discovers next period it will be too far behind.
One can think of the prize-sharing case as corresponding to a model in which the patent is randomly awarded to one of the firms, with equal probabilities, in the event that both make the discovery in the same period (i.e., they are equally likely ex ante to be the first discoverer, or the first to file a patent). In this interpretation the prize is never actually shared but, conditional on this event, each gets v/2 in expectation 7 .
Strategies and Social Payoffs
We will refer to the site choices made by A and B in period t as a(t) and b(t) respectively. A pure strategy for firm A is defined as a map which, for each initial belief p 1 (0) and history of unsuccessful searches {a(τ ), b(τ )} t−1 τ =1 , gives a choice of site in period t. A pure strategy for firm B is the same except that histories include A's choice of site in the current period. This formulation makes the assumption that neither firm ever stops searching; by our assumption that v is large this is without loss of generality. A firm's expected long-run payoff from a given strategy is the expectation of the sum of the periodby-period payoffs, without discounting 8 , where the expectation is taken with respect to p 1 (0), the common prior probability that the treasure is at site S 1 , and the strategy of the other firm. The solution concept that we use is pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which players play stationary strategies 9 . This means firstly that each firm's choice of site after any history depends only on the updated probability that the treasure is at site S 1 (this is defined by Bayes' rule after any history) and, in the case of firm B, on firm A's current choice of site. Secondly, each firm's strategy after any history maximizes its expected future payoff given the other's strategy and the current belief. We assume throughout that if a firm is indifferent between the two sites then it chooses site S 1 .
The payoff of the social planner is given as follows. Let τ be the period in which discovery takes place. Then the social payoff is
if discovery never takes place. If the social planner chooses an optimal policy (i.e., allocates firms to sites in each period so as to maximize expected social payoff) then his expected payoff is
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of the stopping time τ . This is because the prize will then be discovered in finite time with probability one.
8 The no-discounting assumption is made for convenience. The fact that there is always a strictly positive probability that the game will end in the current period means that it has many of the features of a model with discounting. For example, the one-deviation property of games with discounting applies, and the players behave as if they were impatient in the sense that they prefer to discover early because of the risk that the other player will discover first.
9 Of course, the equilibrium strategies must be robust to all deviations, non-stationary as well as stationary.
The Static Case
We first discuss the one-period version of the model for purposes of comparison with the full game. In this case the game ends after one period even if there has been no discovery.
We assume that π 1 = π 2 = π.
Consider first the socially optimal solution. Let V (i, j) be the expected surplus if firm A goes to site S i and firm B goes to site S j (i, j = 1, 2). Let p 1 be the prior probability that the prize is at S 1 . Then
These three functions are linear in p 1 . This implies that the unit interval can be divided
for both firms to search at site S 2 ; (ii) if p 1 ∈ [γ 2 , γ 1 ) one should search at S 1 and the other at S 2 ; and (iii) if p 1 ∈ [γ 1 , 1] then both firms should search at S 1 . The boundaries γ 1 and γ 2 are given by
. Now consider the non-cooperative game. Let V A (i, j) and V B (i, j) respectively be A's and B's expected payoff if A searches at site S i and B searches at site S j . Assume first that payoffs are Bertrand. Then
Therefore, if A has chosen site S 1 , B prefers site S 1 if and only if p 1 ≥ γ 1 . By a similar calculation, if A has chosen site S 2 , B prefers site S 1 if and only if p 1 ≥ γ 2 .. It follows that if p 1 ∈ [0, γ 2 ) then A, taking into account B's reaction, chooses between (1, 2) and (2, 2) ((1, 2) refers to the situation in which A searches site S 1 and B searches S 2 , etc.).
Similarly, if p 1 ∈ [γ 2 , γ 1 ) then A chooses between (1, 2) and (2, 1) and if p 1 ∈ [γ 1 , 1] she chooses between (1, 1) and (2, 1).
if and only if
The conclusion is that in equilibrium A chooses site S 2 if p 1 < γ and
Therefore the equilibrium outcome is (2, 2) if
. This implies that the equilibrium is efficient since the outcome is socially optimal for every value of p 1 .
We look next at the case of prize-sharing payoffs. Clearly the socially optimal policy is the same as before. In the non-cooperative game, if A chooses S 1 , B prefers S 1 to S 2 if and only if
i.e., if and only if
In the case where A has chosen S 2 , B prefers S 1 if and only if
Therefore, as in the Bertrand case, there is a region of low values of p 1 (in this case 
> γ 2 . This means that there is too much duplication compared with the social optimum in the sense that the set of values of p 1 for which the firms invest in the same project is strictly larger than (i.e., strictly contains) the set of values for which the social planner would require them to do so. In summary, we have
Proposition 1 In the one-period game: (a) given Bertrand payoffs, the non-cooperative equilibrium is efficient; (b) given prize-sharing payoffs, the non-cooperative equilibrium involves too much duplication of research effort relative to the social optimum.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The social value of a discovery by one firm is v in the event that the other firm does not make the discovery and zero in the event that it does. With Bertrand payoffs, a firm's private payoff coincides with this and so its project choice decision will be efficient in equilibrium. With prize-sharing, on the other hand, there is a private payoff for a second discovery but no social payoff. This implies that a given firm obtains too much payoff in the event of simultaneous discovery and so there is too much incentive to choose the same project as the other firm.
Excessive Duplication and the Effort Externality
We have assumed above that the probability π of a given firm making the discovery at a given site conditional on the treasure being at that site is exogenous. In this section we relax this assumption and assume instead that the conditional probability is determined by the research effort which the firm puts in. In this variant of the model A first chooses a site, B then chooses a site after observing A's choice, A then observes B's choice and both finally select, simultaneously, an effort level from the unit interval which translates one-for-one into a conditional discovery probability π. The cost of obtaining conditional probability π at site i is c i (π) where c i (.) ≥ 0 is assumed to be strictly convex and sufficiently smooth and to satisfy c 0 i (0) = 0 and lim π→1 c 0 i (π) = ∞. As before, firms are symmetric except in the order of their moves. We assume that payoffs are Bertrand.
Suppose that both firms have chosen site S 1 and let the equilibrium effort (and hence probability) choices of A and B respectively be π A and π B . These quantities will of course depend on the prior belief p 1 as well as on the choice of sites. The first order conditions for A's and B's problems respectively are then
Given our assumptions about c 1 (.), these equations have a unique symmetric solution π S 1 > 0 which solves the two problems. The social planner's problem, conditional on both firms being at S 1 , is:
Clearly the first-order conditions for this problem coincide with (1) and (2) above and so the non-cooperative effort choices are efficient, conditional on the choice of site.
Suppose now that one firm (say, firm A) has chosen S 1 and the other has chosen S 2 .
The first-order condition for the firm at S 1 is
The social planner's problem is now
and so the first-order conditions coincide with (3) and the corresponding equation for firm B. Again, therefore, we see that effort choices are efficient. The same conclusion applies for the other combinations of site choices. As above, the intuition for this result is that the 
The social planner, on the other hand, prefers B to go to site
the inequality following because π D 1 maximizes p 1 vπ − c 1 (π) by definition and c 1 (.) is strictly convex. It follows that the social planner's incentive to diversify research projects is greater than the private incentive to do so: B chooses site S 1 (the same site as A) on a larger set of values of p 1 than the social planner would. A similar conclusion applies if A has chosen site S 2 . These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the one-period game in which firms first choose sites sequentially and then choose research efforts simultaneously, the equilibrium effort choices are efficient given the site choices. The choices of sites, however, exhibit too much duplication.
The reason for the inefficiency is that if firm A has chosen site S 1 then B, if it also does so, causes an externality because it reduces A's effort. This means that B prefers to go to the same site as A more than is socially optimal. The result that effort choices are conditionally efficient distinguishes this model from those of Loury (1979) , Reinganum (1979 Reinganum ( , 1982 and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , in which there is overinvestment in research as a result of rivalry 11 .
4 Infinite-horizon Search: the Pre-Emption Effect
In this section we consider the infinite-horizon game in which the conditional probabilities of discovery are exogenous and equal at the two sites. We maintain the assumption that
payoffs are Bertrand. We analyze the perfect Bayesian equilibria in stationary strategies and compare them with the socially optimal policy.
Recall that our assumptions on the costs c 1 and c 2 imply that regardless of the history neither firm will ever stop searching and that the social planner will always want both firms to search. This implies that a pair of pure strategies for the two firms and an initial belief p 1 (0) define an outcome path, i.e., an infinite sequence {a(t), b(t)} ∞ t=1 , the interpretation being that this is the sequence of pairs of sites which the two firms will search on the equilibrium path, stopping when the random discovery time arrives.
Some further notation will be helpful. (1, 2) ∞ refers to the outcome path according to which A always goes to site S 1 and B always to site S 2 , (1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ to the path in which both initially go to S 1 and then they continue with (1, 2) ∞ and [(1, 1)(2, 2)] ∞ to the path in which they alternate between (1, 1) and (2, 2), starting with (1, 1). Other infinite outcome paths are similarly defined. It will also be useful to define two-period outcome paths {(1, 1)(1, 2)}, {(1, 2), (2, 2)}, etc. and k-period outcome paths for finite k > 2. We let V (., p 1 ) denote the expected social payoff, relative to belief p 1 , of a given finite or infinite path and let V A (., p 1 ) and V B (., p 1 ) denote the corresponding payoffs 11 Our result that research intensity of a given firm falls as the number of firms at a given site rises is related to the result in Loury (1979) (although his paper does not allow a choice of research avenues). See also, in different contexts, Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) .
of firm A and firm B respectively. For example, V ((1, 2) ∞ , p 1 ) is the social planner's expected payoff when his policy is for A always to search site S 1 and B always to search site S 2 and V B ({(1, 1)(1, 2)}, p 1 ) is B's expected payoff, given p 1 , if the search sequence is {(1, 1)(1, 2)} and the game ends after two periods whether or not the prize has been found. Where there is no risk of confusion the term p 1 will sometimes be dropped from these expressions.
Since, in the non-cooperative analysis, we shall confine attention to equilibrium paths in which players use stationary strategies, firm A's choice of site will depend only on its current probability that the treasure is at S 1 and B's only on this belief plus A's current choice. Furthermore, because the problem itself is stationary, the social planner's optimal policy can be similarly represented as a map from current beliefs to pairs of sites. Given any history of play and interior initial belief p 1 (0) the updated belief will be pinned down by Bayes' rule. Given i, j = 1, 2, let p((i, j), p 1 ) be the updated probability that the treasure is at site S 1 at the start of period t + 1 when the corresponding probability was p 1 in the previous period, A has searched site S i at period t, B has searched site S j at period t and both have failed to find the treasure. In a similar way, p({(1, 2)(1, 1)}, p 1 ), etc., refers to the updated belief after two unsuccessful periods of search. Clearly, if 0 < p 1 < 1 then after both firms unsuccessfully search site S 1 they will revise downwards their probability that S 1 is the right site, so p((1, 1),
Two other facts which follow easily from Bayes' rule, together with the fact that the sites are symmetrical with respect to their conditional probabilities, and which will be repeatedly used below, are
The social optimum
First we consider the socially optimal solution. Let
, and let
.
α 1 has the property that if p 1 = α 1 then the social planner is indifferent between the two sequences {(1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ } and (1, 2) ∞ and strictly prefers the former if p 1 > α 1 .. To see this, note that
since the treasure will be found with probability 1 and the expected cost of search is
because the probability of discovery in period 1 is p 1 π(2 − π) and the term in square brackets is the probability of non-discovery in the first period. Re-arranging, we see that
Similar calculations (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix) establish that
Equivalent inequalities apply for the symmetric expressions. For example, if p 1 = α 2 then the social planner is indifferent between {(2, 2)(1, 2) ∞ } and (1, 2) ∞ and strictly prefers the former if p 1 < α 2 .
We shall show that the optimal policy is to choose (2, 2) if p 1 < α 2 , (1, 2) if α 2 ≤ p 1 < α 1 and (1, 1) if p 1 ≥ α 1 . From Bayes' rule (see Lemma A.2 in the Appendix), p((1, 1), α 1 ) ≥ α 2 and p((2, 2), α 2 ) ≤ α 1 and these inequalities are strict if c 1 > c 2 . This, together with (4), implies that the outcome path is one of three types, depending on p 1 (0), the initial value of p 1 . If p 1 (0) < α 2 then the optimum policy is for both to search S 2 for some finite number of periods and then switch forever to a policy of having one firm at each site; if p 1 (0) ≥ α 1 then they both search S 1 for a finite number of periods before diversifying; and in the intermediate range of beliefs they diversify from the outset.
To establish that the above policy is optimal, note first that for any value of p 1 there are only three possible choices: (1, 1), (2, 2) and (1, 2) (we can ignore (2, 1) without loss of generality because the two firms are identical). Suppose that p 1 > α 1 . If (1, 2) is optimal then, by (4), the belief will be unchanged after there is no discovery in period 1 and so
(1, 2) will be optimal again next period. Hence, the outcome sequence is (1, 2) ∞ . But, by (6), this is inferior to {(1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ } and so (1, 2) is not optimal. If, on the other hand, (2, 2) is optimal then there are three different types of possible outcome sequence.
Either (a) they both search S 2 forever; or (b) the outcome sequence starts with (2, 2) k times followed by (1, 2), for some finite k; or (c) the outcome sequence starts with (2, 2) k times followed by (1, 1), for some finite k. Case (a) is clearly impossible since the belief p 1 would converge to 1 and so it must become suboptimal to search site S 2 . Case (b) cannot apply because after k periods the updated belief p k 1 will satisfy p k 1 > α 1 and so, from the argument above, (1, 2) will not then be optimal. In case (c), the continuation search sequence after k − 1 periods will be [(2, 2)(1, 1)] ∞ (using (5)) but, by (7) this is inferior
is not optimal and we conclude that the optimal choice when p 1 > α 1 must be (1, 1). Symmetric arguments show that (2, 2) is optimal when p 1 < α 2 . Finally, consider the intermediate range [
were not optimal then the possible optimal outcome paths would be (i) (1, 1) k times followed by (1, 2) ∞ , for some finite k ≥ 1, (ii) (1, 1) k times followed by [(2, 2)(1, 1)] ∞ , together with two types of path symmetrical to these which begin with (2, 2). In case (i) the continuation path after k − 1 periods is {(1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ }, which is suboptimal by (6) since the updated belief p k−1 1 < α 1 . Similarly, in case (ii), the continuation after k − 1 periods is [(1, 1)(2, 2)] ∞ , which is suboptimal by (8) since then p
This establishes the following result (appealing to continuity at the point p 1 = α 1 ).
Proposition 3
The socially optimal policy in the infinite horizon problem is for both firms to search at S 2 if p 1 < α 2 , both to search at S 1 if p 1 ≥ α 1 and one to search at each site if α 2 ≤ p 1 < α 1 .
It is worth comparing this solution with the one obtained in the one-period problem.
Firstly, note that in the case where the sites are symmetric with respect to their costs, i.e., c 1 = c 2 , then α 1 = (2 − π) −1 = γ 1 and α 2 = (1 − π)(2 − π) −1 = γ 2 . Therefore the infinite horizon solution is the same as the myopic policy: in each period the social planner should allocate firms to sites in such a way as to maximize the probability of discovery in the current period. This means that the planner never has an incentive to experiment in the sense of giving up some expected payoff in the current period in order to acquire information which might increase future expected payoff. In effect, the planner wants to minimize the expected time to discovery and this is achieved by maximizing the probability of discovery period by period. Secondly, the above is no longer true if the costs at the two sites are different. If c 1 > c 2 then
and so, since vπ > c 1 + c 2 , α 1 > γ 1 . Similarly, α 2 > γ 2 , so that, compared with the one-period problem, the cut-off values have moved to the right. This is intuitive. The social planner now has a bias towards the low cost site: for some values of the prior he chooses to search S 2 first rather than S 1 even though the latter would maximize the current probability of discovery. He does this because it minimizes the long-run cost of discovery. On one interval the optimum choice is (2, 2) rather than the myopic choice (1, 2) and on another it is (1, 2) rather than (1, 1).
The non-cooperative game
Consider the following pair (σ A , σ B ) of stationary pure strategies for the non-cooperative game. In these definitions p 1 , as before, is the current probability that the prize is at S 1 and β, β 1 and β 2 are given by
, and
..
We assume that v is sufficiently large that these three quantities are all less than 1. Note that, if v is large enough, then
if p 1 ≥ β 1 . This is because in either of the two sequences (1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ and (1, 2) ∞ firm B will discover the prize if it is at S 2 . The first sequence has the advantage that it gives B a chance of discovery (and a lower expected cost of search) if it's at S 1 and the disadvantage that the expected cost of search is higher in the event that the prize is at S 2 , because of the one-period delay. For values of p 1 above β 1 the former effect will clearly dominate if v is above a critical value 12 . We assume that v is above this value. Similarly, we assume that v is large enough that
If firms A and B respectively employ σ A and σ B then their site choices are (2, 2) if First, assume that B plays σ B and consider A's best response. Consider the region in which p 1 ≥ β 1 . Suppose that it were optimal for A to play S 2 . Then B would respond with S 1 , the belief would then be unchanged (in the event of non-discovery) and it would again be optimal for A to play S 2 . Repeating this argument, we see that the optimal path for A must then be (2, 1) ∞ . Bayes' rule implies (see Lemma A.4 in the Appendix) that p((1, 1), β 1 ) ≥ β 2 and so, if A were to choose S 1 and then always play S 2 , the outcome path would be {(1, 1)(2, 1) ∞ }, which, by (9) (interchanging A and B), is better for A than (2, 1) ∞ . This contradiction establishes that A should choose S 1 . Now consider the region in which β ≤ p 1 < β 1 . If it were optimal for A to choose S 2 then the optimal path would be (2, 1) ∞ . A could, however, induce the path (1, 2) ∞ by always choosing S 1 . Choosing between (1, 2) ∞ and (2, 1) ∞ is equivalent to choosing between (1, 2) and (2, 1) on a one-shot basis. Since V A ((1, 2)) = vp 1 π −c 1 and V A ((2, 1)) =
so it is optimal for A to choose S 1 if p 1 ≥ β. Symmetrical arguments apply to the other two regions and so we conclude that σ A is an optimal response.
Next, consider B's optimal strategy. Fix A's strategy as σ A . Suppose that A has chosen S 1 and p 1 ≥ β 1 . There are two cases to consider: (a) if B chooses S 1 then A's next choice will be S 1 and (b) if B chooses S 1 then A's next choice will be S 2 . Suppose also that, contrary to what we want to establish, it is optimal for B to choose S 2 . In that case the optimal outcome path available to B would be (1, 2) ∞ . However, in case (a), B can induce the outcome path {(1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ } by choosing S 1 now and thereafter always choosing S 2 . By (9), the latter path is better. In case (b) B can, similarly, induce
We show in the Appendix (Lemma A.5) that
if p 1 ≥ β 1 . This shows that in both case (a) and case (b), (1, 2) ∞ is inferior and so B should choose S 1 . Symmetric arguments establish that if A has chosen S 2 and p 1 < β 2 then B should choose S 2 . The remaining cases are treated in the Appendix, together with a proof that this equilibrium is essentially unique.
We have already noted that if c 1 = c 2 the cutoff values in the non-cooperative game coincide with those of the social planner. When c 1 > c 2 , on the other hand, β 2 < α 2 and β 1 < α 1 if v is large (see Lemma A.3 in the Appendix). This implies that there is a region ([β 2 , α 2 )) on which the firms choose (2, 1) rather than the efficient choice (2, 2) and another ([β 1 , α 1 )) on which they choose (1, 1) rather than (1, 2). In other words, the firms are biased towards the high-cost site. Summarizing:
In the infinite horizon model in which the sites are symmetric: If payoffs are Bertrand then equilibrium is efficient. This equilibrium is myopic, i.e., in each period the joint probability of discovery is maximized.
Proposition 5
In the infinite horizon model with asymmetric costs and Bertrand payoffs there is (for high enough v) a bias, relative to the social optimum, towards the high cost site in equilibrium. For some beliefs there is too much correlation: both firms choose the high cost site while it is socially optimal to diversify. For other beliefs there is too much differentiation: it is socially optimal for both firms to choose the low cost site but one of them chooses the high cost site.
When sites are symmetric, therefore, the static case carries over to the infinite horizon.
We saw above that the social planner simply wants to search for the minimum expected number of periods, hence maximize overall probability of discovery in each period. It turns out that firms have no incentive to behave differently. The firms do not choose to experiment in order to learn or to affect the other firm's future choices.
When sites are asymmetric, on the other hand, the social planner no longer simply wants to minimize the expected number of periods spent searching: for some beliefs, it is optimal to choose the lower cost site even though this means a lower probability of discovery this period. Firms too have an incentive to do this, but less of an incentive than the social planner. This is because of a pre-emption effect. The winner-take-all payoff structure implies that a firm does not take into account the social value of the other firm's potential future discovery. Whereas the social planner is prepared to wait (in expectation) for discovery in order to search the low-cost site first, each firm has an incentive to pre-empt the other. What the proposition shows is that this pre-emption effect, which is familiar from the literature on R&D, can lead to excessive duplication but it can also lead to insufficient duplication, depending on beliefs.
A Model with Unequal Conditional Probabilities: the Strategic Differentiation Effect.
In the model analyzed above no strategic experimentation takes place: that is, it does not happen that a firm takes an action (chooses a site) which offers a lower current probability of success in order to influence the beliefs, and hence future actions, of the other firm.
In this section we present a variant of our model in which such an effect does take place.
The model differs from the one analyzed above in that the conditional probabilities of discovery at the two sites are unequal (and, for tractability, we limit the analysis to the two-period case). The result is that for some beliefs there is excessive differentiation.
The first-moving firm (A) inefficiently selects the inferior site in the first period in order to avoid choosing the same site as the other firm. The private benefit of doing this arises from changing the second-period beliefs and hence the other's choice in the event of non-discovery.
We assume that c 1 = c 2 = c and that π 1 > π 2 . We also assume that payoffs are Bertrand. Let 0 < δ 2 < δ < δ 1 < 1 be given by
Straightforward calculations show that, in the second period, B employs belief cut-off δ 1 if A has chosen S 1 and cut-off δ 2 if A has chosen S 2 . Similarly, when p 1 = δ, A is indifferent between (1, 2) and (2, 1) and so it is straightforward to show that A uses cut-off δ. Therefore, in equilibrium, the second-period outcome is (2, 2) on [0, δ 2 ), (2, 1) Now consider the first period. Let η > δ 1 be given by
Clearly, by Bayes' rule, p 1 must fall after a search of both sites is unsuccessful, because π 1 > π 2 . The following lemma gives other useful facts about updating. , 1) , η) = δ 2 ;and (e) δ < p((2, 2), δ 2 ) < δ 1 .
Proof: in Appendix.
A second useful result is Lemma 2 (i) If (2, 2) is (strictly) socially preferred in the one stage game to (2, 1) then B (strictly) prefers {(2, 2)(2, 1)} to {(2, 1)(2, 2)}.
(ii) If (1, 2) is (strictly) socially preferred in the one stage game to (1, 1) then B (strictly) prefers {(1, 2)(2, 1)} to {(1, 1)(2, 2)}.
(iii) If (2, 1) is (strictly) socially preferred in the one stage game to (2, 2) then B (strictly) prefers {(2, 1)(1, 2)} to {(2, 2)(1, 1)}.
Proof:(i) Because (2, 2) is socially preferred {(2, 2)(2, 1)} has a lower expected cost of search than {(2, 1)(2, 2)} (since the probability of discovery by at least one firm in the first period is higher). Furthermore, B's probability of being the sole discoverer is the same for each sequence if the prize is at S 1 but higher in {(2, 2)(2, 1)} if it is at S 2 . (ii) and (iii) use the same logic. QED.
The optimum policy for the social planner is to use the same cut-offs as in the second period. For example, suppose that p 1 < δ 2 . If (1, 1) were optimal in the first period then in the second period the updated belief would still be below δ 2 and so the next choice would be (2, 2). Similarly, (1, 2) would be followed by (2, 2). But (2, 2) is myopically optimal, which means that it maximizes the probability of current discovery, and so (2, 2)(1, 1) has a lower expected cost of search than (1, 1)(2, 2). It also has the same probability of discovery and therefore the social planner must prefer it. For the same reason, the social planner must prefer (2, 2)(1, 2) to (1, 2)(2, 2), and so (2, 2) is the optimal first-period choice. The arguments for the other two regions are similar, e.g., if δ 2 ≤ p 1 < δ 1 then the social planner prefers (1, 2)(1, 2) both to (1, 1)(2, 2) and to (2, 2)(1, 1). Therefore the planner should act myopically and maximize the probability of discovery in each period.
Next, consider the first period of the non-cooperative game. In the unique equilibrium, B employs the efficient cut-off points δ 2 and δ 1 (see the Appendix). However, there is a value θ > δ 1 such that A's strategy is to choose S 2 not only if p 1 < δ but also if p 1 falls in [δ 1 , θ). That is, the outcome coincides with the efficient outcome everywhere except on [δ 1 , θ), in which (2, 1) occurs rather than the efficient choice (1, 1).
To establish this, suppose that B's strategy is as described and consider A's best response.
(a) p 1 < δ 2 . A chooses between (1, 2)(2, 2) and either (i) (2, 2)(2, 2), (ii) (2, 2)(2, 1) or (iii) (2, 2)(1, 2) ((2, 2)(1, 1) cannot happen by Lemma 1(e)). (i) A prefers (2, 2)(2, 2) to (2, 2)(1, 2) since, by hypothesis and Lemma 1(e), A prefers (2, 2) to (1, 2) in the second period. By Lemma 2(i) (interchanging A and B), A prefers (2, 2)(1, 2) to (1, 2)(2, 2). Therefore A should choose S 2 . (ii) calculation shows that A prefers (2, 2)(2, 1) to (1, 2)(2, 2) iff prefers (2, 2) (1, 2) to (1, 2)(2, 2) by Lemma 2(i).
(b) δ 2 ≤ p 1 < δ 1 . Whether A chooses S 1 or S 2 , B will choose the other site and so the second-period belief is the same in either case. Therefore A should maximize his current discovery probability, i.e., choose S 2 iff p 1 < δ.
(c) δ 1 ≤ p 1 < η. By Lemma 1(b), 1(c) and 1(d), A chooses between (1, 1)(2, 2) and
Let ϕ = min( e ϕ, η). Since e ϕ > δ 1 , there is an interval (δ 1 , ϕ) in which A prefers to go to S 2 rather than to the efficient choice S 1 .
On this interval, B goes to S 1 regardless of A ' s decision. A's expected benefit if the prize is at S 1 is the same in the two sequences (1, 1)(2, 2) and (2, 1)(1, 2) (i.e. vp 1 (1 − π 1 )π 1 ) while his expected benefit if it is at S 2 is greater in the sequence (2, 1)(1, 2), because A then pre-empts B to some extent. On the other hand, if A chooses S 2 then his probability of being the sole discoverer (and the overall probability of discovery) in period 1 is lower (which is why (2, 1) is inefficient -the efficient solution maximizes the probability of discovery period by period); this means that A's expected cost is higher because there is a higher probability of reaching period 2. On the interval (δ 1 , ϕ) the first effect predominates. Intuitively, the first mover gives up some probability of discovery in period 1 in order to induce differentiation, which benefits him.
In the case where π 1 = π 2 the choice (1, 1)(2, 2) versus (2, 1)(1, 2) never arises because if p 1 is such that (1, 1) would be played in the single period game then (2, 1) would be followed by (1, 1), not (1, 2). In other words, for this form of strategic differentiation to exist, it has to be the case that something is learned after the two firms have searched different sites but failed to find the prize. Summarizing the above discussion:
Proposition 6 In the two-period model with asymmetric conditional probabilities, the efficient policy is to maximize probability of discovery in each period. In equilibrium (with Bertrand payoffs) there is too much differentiation in the first period. For some beliefs it is socially optimal for both firms to search the high-probability site but the first mover chooses the low-probability site.
6 A Two-period Model with an Informed Firm: the Disinformation Effect.
In this section we consider a version of the model in which firm A may have some private information about the identity of the right site and we uncover a further way in which inefficient under-duplication may occur: firm A may in equilibrium choose in the first period what it knows to be the wrong site in order to "deceive" firm B and as a result subsequently search the right site on its own.
There are two periods. As before, p 1 is the probability that the prize is at S 1 -this probability is commonly held at the outset. At the start of period 1 firm A, with probability θ (0 < θ < 1), gets a signal which accurately informs him where the prize is.
Firm B gets no signal. The firms then play the two-period game described in the previous sections, with c 1 = c 2 = c and π 1 = π 2 = π. We will refer to the three types of firm A as A 1 , A 2 and A u (respectively: informed that the prize is at S 1 , informed that it is at S 2 , and uninformed). As before, we assume that v is large. We also make the following two assumptions.
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As an illustration, if π = θ = 1/2, the interval specified by Assumption 2 is (0.8, 0.89).
We shall exhibit an equilibrium in which, in period 1, all three types of A choose S 1 , B also chooses S 1 , and then in the next period (assuming no discovery in period 1) A 2 and A u both choose S 2 while B responds to the choice of S 2 by choosing S 1 . In other words, if A knows that the treasure is at S 2 then he successfully hides this fact from B and leads him up the wrong path. For the interval of p 1 values symmetrical to the one in Assumption 2 there is an equilibrium in which, in a similar way, A 1 leads B away from
For this game of incomplete information, let the profile of strategies and beliefs (e σ A , e σ B ; φ) be defined as follows. (1, 1), 1) be the corresponding belief after the first-period choice pair was (1, 1), no discovery was made in period 1 and A has then chosen S 1 in period 2, and let the other beliefs be written in the analogous way. Then
where
Proposition 7 Given Assumptions 1 and 2, and sufficiently large v, (e σ A , e σ B ; φ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The equilibrium set out in this proposition exhibits insufficient duplication in the sense that ex post efficiency requires that both firms search site S 2 in both periods whereas in equilibrium they search different sites in period 2. There is also of course a further inefficiency in that they both search the wrong site in period 1.
Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled a process of R&D, or more generally problem-solving, in which (i) there is rivalry and there is an advantage to being the first to solve the problem,
(ii) there are alternative approaches that can be used and players are uncertain as to which approach is correct (or better), (iii) players observe the results of prior moves of their rivals, and (iv) each move is costly but the cost is small relative to the value of being first. In this setting of dynamic competition, we have addressed the question of whether players tend to duplicate each other's approaches too much, relative to the allocation that is optimal from the point of view of a planner who wants the problem solved for the lowest expected cost. This is, we believe, a novel approach to a problem that has received some attention in the literature, first in the sociology of science, and then in the economics literature, mainly using static models. We find that with "Bertrand" payoffs there may be too much or too little duplication, depending on the parameter values and the nature of the specific variant of the model considered; however, when payoffs are shared in the event of simultaneous discovery, there is a tendency for too much duplication.
One possibly unrealistic feature of our model is the restriction that only one approach can be explored in any given period. This may be appropriate if the players are cashconstrained but, more generally, firms face the problem of how much resource to devote to each of a number of projects. We feel, nevertheless, that the model captures important aspects of the R&D process, as the examples cited earlier suggest. Many extensions suggest themselves, such as (i) asymmetric players, (ii) players who become more adept at an approach by working on it, (iii) intermediate discoveries and (iv) the formation of research coalitions to pursue research using different approaches.
i.e., iff
which reduces to
This reduces to
Proof:
The assumption that α 1 < 1 implies that
and so
Thus p((1, 1), α 1 ) − α 2 has the same sign as
which reduces to π(2 − π)(c 1 − c 2 ) 2 . The relation between p((2, 2), α 2 ) and α 1 is symmetrical. QED Lemma A.3 If c 1 > c 2 , β 1 < α 1 and β 2 < α 2 if v is large enough.
and the numerator of the right-hand expression is strictly negative if and only if
which is equivalent to
Therefore if v satisfies this inequality β 1 < α 1 . The fact that β 2 < α 2 follows similarly.
QED.
Lemma A.4 p((1, 1), β 1 ) ≥ β 2 and p((1, 1),
, using Bayes' rule. This is equivalent to
. (λ 1 < 1 − π and λ 2 < 1 by the assumption that β 1 < 1 and β 2 < 1). Since λ
, this reduces to π < 2 and so p((1, 1), β 1 ) > β 2 in that case. If c 1 = c 2 then λ 1 = λ 2 = 0 and the two sides of (A.1) are then equal. QED.
if and only if p 1 ≥ β 1 and the inequality is strict if p 1 > β 1 .
i.e., using the fact that
Clearly equality holds in this expression only if p 1 = β 1 . QED.
Proof that (σ A , σ B ) is an equilibrium. It remains to show that σ B is a best response to σ A in the region [0, β 1 ) when A has chosen S 1 together with the case symmetric to this when A has chosen S 2 . Suppose that A has chosen S 1 and p 1 < β 1 . Assume that from next period (σ A , σ B ) will be played. Although there is no discounting in this model, the one-step deviation principle applies because the positive probability that the game will end in the current period acts in a similar way to a discount factor. Therefore, to
show that σ B is an optimal response, we have to check that B cannot profitably deviate in the current period, assuming that the two firms will play according to these strategies from next period. We need to show that it is optimal for B to choose S 2 . As v → ∞,
which implies that if v is large enough, p((1, 1), β 1 ) < β. Therefore, if B were to choose S 1 , A's next choice would be S 2 .
(a) First consider the interval [β, β 1 ). B can, depending on which interval the updated belief will fall in after (1, 1) is unsuccessful, either choose between (i) (1, 2) ∞ and
This is equivalent to
and the right side of this expression is strictly greater than β 1 .
(b) Next, suppose that p 1 ∈ [β 2 , β). If B chooses S 2 , the outcome path will be {(1, 2)(2, 1) ∞ }. If B chooses S 1 , it will either be (i) {(1, 1)(2, 1)
Case (i):
which, using the fact that p((1, 1),
which is satisfied for sufficiently high v if p 1 < β. Therefore B should choose S 2 . Case (ii):
which is satisfied for sufficiently high v. Again, therefore, B should choose S 2 .
(c) p 1 < β 2 . Assume as before that A has chosen S 1 and that A will play σ A from next period but not necessarily that B will play σ B : assume instead that B will play some optimal response to σ A giving expected payoff e V B (p). If B chooses S 2 , B's expected payoff is
This is because the outcome path will start with (1, 2) and the updated belief will then be p 1 . If B chooses S 1 then the outcome path will start with (1, 1)(2, 2) (since, from the argument in the text, it is optimal for B to play S 2 in response to S 2 when p 1 < β 2 ) and B's continuation payoff after that will be e V B (p 1 ). Therefore we have to show that
However, by always playing S 1 in response to S 2 , B can induce the outcome sequence
Re-arranging, we see that the above inequality is satisfied if v is large enough.
Together with symmetrical arguments for the case in which A has chosen S 2 , this establishes that (σ A , σ B ) is an equilibrium. QED.
Proof that in any stationary equilibrium the choice pair is (2, 2) if p 1 < β 2 , (1, 1) if
Note first that, from Lemma A.4 above, β 2 ≤ p[(1, 1),
Secondly, note that if v is large enough and
This is because B's expected benefit if the prize is at S 2 is the same in the two sequences [(1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ ] and (1, 2) ∞ (he will discover it in either case) but higher in the former sequence if the prize is at S 1 . The expected cost of search in the first sequence may be higher because of the one-period delay in searching S 2 but, for any given value of p 1 , the first effect must dominate if v is high enough.
Consider any perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which players play stationary strategies.
Let σ A (p 1 ) be firm A's choice of site for belief p 1 and let σ B (p 1 , S i ) be B's choice of site when A has chosen S i .
(1) Suppose that p 1 > β 1 and σ
Then the equilibrium path must be (1, 2) ∞ . Consider a deviation by B to S 1 after A has chosen S 1 . Either (i) B can induce the sequence (1, 1)(2, 1) ∞ , which is better than (1, 2) ∞ by Lemma A.5, or (ii) B can induce the sequence (1, 1)(1, 2) ∞ , which is better than (1, 2) ∞ by (A.3). QED.
(2) Suppose that p 1 > β 2 and σ A (p 1 ) = S 2 . Then σ B (p 1 , S 2 ) = S 1 . Symmetrically, if
Proof: Suppose that p 1 > β 2 , that σ A (p 1 ) = S 2 and that σ B (p 1 , S 2 ) = S 2 . Then there are four possibilities for the equilibrium path:
(ii) (2, 2) k times followed by (1, 2)
(iii) (2, 2) k times followed by (2, 1) ∞ , and (iv) (2, 2) k times followed by [(1, 1)(2, 2)] ∞ .
Case (i) cannot happen because the belief will converge to 1 along the equilibrium path and at some point it must become suboptimal to search S 2 .
Case (ii): After k − 1 iterations of (2, 2) B could induce the path (2, 1) ∞ and, letting
be the updated value of the belief, this is better for B than (2, 2)(1, 2) ∞ by the symmetric expression to (A1) (interchanging the sites) since p k−1 1 > β 2 .. Therefore this case cannot happen either.
Case (iii): After k iterations of (2, 2), p ∞ by (11), so A has a profitable deviation. Therefore (b) if A chooses S 1 then B will choose S 1 . In that case it must be that
since the two paths in these expressions are the equilibrium continuations after B chooses S 1 and S 2 respectively once A has deviated to S 1 . This implies that
and so, by symmetry,
which means, since p
But then A, by deviating to S 1 whenever p 1 = p k 1 , can get at least as much as her equilibrium payoff. By our assumption that she chooses S 1 whenever indifferent, this is a contradiction. Therefore case (iii) cannot obtain. Case (iv): After k−1 iterations of (2, 2), B can choose between (2, 1) ∞ and [(2, 2)(1, 1)] ∞ .
Adapting the argument in paragraph (a) of the existence proof above (interchanging the sites), we see that B strictly prefers the former if
and the left-hand side expression is less than β 2 , hence less than p k−1 1 . Therefore B has a profitable deviation. This contradiction rules out case (iv). QED.
Proof: Suppose that p 1 > β 1 and σ A (p 1 ) = S 2 . Then the equilibrium path is (2, 1) (4) If β 2 < p 1 < β 1 then the current period choice pair is either (1, 2) or (2, 1).
Proof: This follows immediately from (2). QED.
This completes the proof that equilibrium is essentially unique. QED.
Proof of Lemma 1. (a)
p((1, 1), δ 1 ) 1 − p((1, 1),
(c) p((1, 2), η) 1 − p((1, 2), η) = (1 − π 1 )η (1 − π 2 )(1 − η) = π 2 (1 − π 1 )π 1 = δ 1 1 − δ 1 .
(d) and (e) are similar.
Proof of Proposition 6.
It remains to show that B's strategy is an optimal response to A's strategy.
Suppose A has chosen S 1 .
(i) p 1 < δ 2 . (1, 1) and (1, 2) would both be followed by (2, 2). Clearly (1, 2)(2, 2) is preferred by B to (1, 2)(2, 1). By Lemma 2(ii), B prefers (1, 2)(2, 1) to (1, 1)(2, 2). Therefore B prefers (1, 2)(2, 2) to (1, 1)(2, 2) and so should choose S 2 .
(ii) δ 2 ≤ p 1 < δ 1 .
(1, 1) would be followed by (2, 2) by Lemma 1(a). B chooses between either (a) (1, 1)(2, 2) and (1, 2)(2, 2), (b) (1, 1)(2, 2) and (1, 2)(2, 1) or (c) (1, 1)(2, 2) and (1, 2)(1, 2). Case (a): B prefers (1, 2)(2, 2) to (1, 2)(2, 1) and, by Lemma 2(ii), prefers the latter to (1, 1)(2, 2). Therefore B chooses S 2 .
(iii) δ 1 ≤ p 1 < η. By Lemma 1(b), (c) and (d), B chooses between (1, 1)(2, 2) and
(1, 2)(1, 2). By (12), B chooses S 1 .
(iv) p 1 ≥ η: (1, 2) would be followed by (1, 1) by Lemma 1(c). By Lemma 1, (1, 1)
will not be followed by (2, 2). If (1, 1) would be followed by (2, 1) then B prefers this to (1, 2)(1, 1) because it gives a lower expected cost of search (since (1, 1) is more likely to succeed) and a higher probability of sole discovery (since p 1 > δ 1 ). The other two cases are straightforward.
Suppose A has chosen S 2 .
(i) p 1 < δ 2 . (2, 1) would be followed by (2, 2). If (2, 2) would also be followed by (2, 2) then B prefers (2, 2)(2, 2) to (2, 2)(2, 1), and, by Lemma 2(ii), prefers the latter to (2, 1)(2, 2). If not, then, by Lemma 1(e), (2, 2) would be followed by (2, 1) or (1, 2). B prefers (2, 2)(2, 1) to (2, 1)(2, 2) by Lemma 2(ii). A calculation shows that This establishes that it is optimal for B to choose S 2 .
(ii) p 1 ≥ δ 2 . By Lemma 1(e), (2, 2) would be followed by either (a) (1, 2) or (b)
(1, 1). (a) (2, 1) cannot be followed by (1, 1).. Suppose that (2, 1) would also be followed by (1, 2). B clearly prefers (2, 1)(1, 2) to (2, 1)(2, 2) and, by (13), prefers the latter to (2, 2)(1, 2).. If, on the other hand, A would choose S 2 after (2, 1) then B can induce (2, 1)(2, 2), which, by (13), is better than (2, 2)(1, 2). (b) If (2, 1) would also be followed by (1, 1) then B prefers (2, 1) since then (2, 1)(1, 1) is better for B than (2, 1)(1, 2) which is better than (2, 2)(1, 1) by Lemma 2(iii). The same conclusion follows if (2, 1) would be followed by (1, 2) since (2, 1)(1, 2) is better for B than (2, 2)(1, 1) by Lemma 2(iii).
Assume then that after (2, 1) A chooses S 2 . B can therefore induce (2, 1)(2, 2) and, by a routine calculation, this gives B a higher probability of winning than (2, 2)(1, 1) if and only if p 1 > δ 2 . Since it also has a lower expected search cost, we conclude that B should choose S 1 . QED.
Proof of Proposition 7. It is easy to see that the beliefs are consistent with the strategies and Bayes' rule.
The second-period strategies of A 1 and A 2 are clearly optimal. After (1, 1), A u chooses between (1, 1) and (2, 1) and his updated belief b p 1 is less than (2 − π) −1 since
by Assumption 2. Therefore he prefers (2, 1). After (1, 2) or (2, 1) he chooses between (1, 1) and (2, 2) and, since his updated belief is p 1 > 1/2 (by Assumption 2), he prefers (1, 1). After (2, 2) he chooses between (1, 1) and (2, 2) and his belief is clearly strictly greater than p 1 > 1/2. Again, therefore, it is optimal to choose S 1 . Now consider B's second-period strategy. All the cases are trivial except for two. (i) If A has chosen S 2 after (1, 1) then B's updated probability that the prize is at S 1 is
S 1 is the optimal choice if p * 1 > (1 − π)(2 − π) −1 and this is equivalent to p 1 > [1 + (1 − π)(1 − θ)] −1 which is satisfied by Assumption 2. (ii) If A has chosen S 1 after (1, 2) then B's updated probability of S 1 is clearly greater than p 1 , hence greater than (2 − π) −1 ; therefore S 1 is optimal for B.
In the first period, A u chooses between (1, 1)(2, 1) and (2, 2)(1, 1). Conditional on S 1 , these sequences give A the same probability of being the sole discoverer. Conditional on S 2 , the former gives a higher probability. Since p 1 > 1/2, the former also has a lower expected cost and so is preferred. A 1 chooses between (1, 1)(1, 1) and (2, 2)(1, 1) and obviously prefers the former since he knows that S 1 is the right site. A 2 chooses between (1, 1)(2, 1) and (2, 2)(2, 2). The former is preferred if v(π − (1 − π) 3 ) > c(2 − π). By Assumption 1, π > (1 − π) 3 and so this inequality is satisfied for high enough v. If A has chosen S 2 then it is clearly optimal for B to do the same since he believes that A is type A 2 . Suppose that A has chosen S 1 . B then chooses between two random prospects:
{(1, 1)(2, 1) if A is type A u or type A 2 , otherwise (1, 1)(1, 1)} and {(1, 2)(2, 2) if A is type As v becomes large the right side of this expression tends to
which is less than [1 + (1 − π)(1 − θ)] −1 . Therefore, by Assumption 2, (14) is satisfied for large enough v and so it is optimal for B to choose S 1 . QED.
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